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ABSTRACT
2-TBSG is a two-player game model which aims to find Nash equilibriums and is
widely utilized in reinforced learning and AI. Inspired by the fact that the simplex
method for solving the deterministic discounted Markov decision processes (MDPs)
is strongly polynomial independent of the discounted factor, we are trying to an-
swer an open problem whether there is a similar algorithm for 2-TBSG. We develop
a simplex strategy iteration where one player updates its strategy with a simplex
step while the other player finds an optimal counterstrategy in turn, and a modified
simplex strategy iteration. Both of them belong to a class of geometrically converg-
ing algorithms. We establish the strongly polynomial property of these algorithms
by considering a strategy combined from the current strategy and the equilibrium
strategy. Moreover, we present a method to transform general 2-TBSGs into special
2-TBSGs where each state has exactly two actions.
KEYWORDS
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1. Introduction
Markov decision process (MDP) is a widely used model in machine learning and opera-
tions research [1], which establishs basic rules of reinforcement learning. While solving
an MDP focuses on maximizing (minimizing) the total reward (cost) for only one
player, we consider a broader class of problems, the 2-player turn based stochastic
games (2-TBSG) [15], which involves two players with opposite objectives. One player
aims to maximize the total reward, and the other player aims to minimize the total
reward. MDP and 2-TBSG have many useful applications, see [2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 16].
Similar to MDP, every 2-TBSG has its state set and action set, both of which
are divided into two subsets for each player, respectively. Moreover, its transition
probability matrix describes the transition distribution over the state set conditioned
on the current action, and its reward function describes the immediate reward when
taking the action.
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We use a strategy (policy) to denote a mapping from the state set into the action
set. In our setting, we focus on the discounted 2-TBSG, where the reward in later steps
is multiplied by a discounted factor. Given strategies (policies) for both players, the
total reward is defined to be the sum of all discounted rewards. We solve a 2-TBSG by
finding its Nash equilibrium strategy (equilibrium strategy for short), where the first
player cannot change its own strategy to obtain a larger total reward, and the second
player cannot change its own strategy to obtain a smaller total reward. MDP can be
viewed as a special case of 2-TBSG, where all states belong to the first player. In such
cases, the equilibrium strategy agrees with the optimal policy of MDP.
MDPs have their linear programming (LP) formulations [3]. Hence algorithms solv-
ing LP problems can be used to solve MDPs. One of the most commonly used algo-
rithm in MDP is the policy iteration algorithm [8], which can be viewed as a parallel
counterpart of the simplex method solving the corresponding LP. In paper [18], both
the simplex method solving the corresponding LP and the policy iteration algorithms
have been proved to find the optimal policy in O
(
ml
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
, where m, l, γ are
the number of actions, the number of states and the discounted factor, respectively.
Later in [7], the bound for the policy iteration algorithm is improved by a factor l to
O
(
m
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
. In [14], this bound is improved to O
(
m
1−γ log
1
1−γ
)
. When the MDP
is deterministic (all transition probabilities are either 0 or 1), a strongly polynomial
bound independent on the discounted factor is proved in [11] for the simplex policy
iteration method (each iteration changes only one action): O(m2l3 log2 l) for uniform
discounted MDPs and O(m3l5 log2 l) for nonuniform discounted MDPs.
However, there is no simple LP formulation for 2-TBSGs. The strategy iteration
algorithm [13], an analogue to the policy iteration, is a commonly used algorithm in
finding the equilibrium strategy of 2-TBSGs. It is a strongly polynomial time algorithm
first proved in [7] with a guarantee to find the equilibrium inO
(
m
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
iterations
if the discounted factor is fixed. When the discounted factor is not fixed, an exponential
lower bound is given for the policy iteration in MDP [4] and for the strategy iteration
in 2-TBSG [6]. It is an open problem whether there is a strongly polynomial algorithm
whose complexity is independent of the discounted factor for 2-TBSG.
Motivated by the strongly polynomial simplex algorithm for solving MDPs, we
present a simplex strategy iteration algorithm and a modified simplex strategy itera-
tion algorithm for the 2-TBSG. In both algorithms each player updates in turn, where
the second player always finds the best counterstrategy in its turn. In the simplex
strategy iteration algorithm the first player updates its strategy using the simplex al-
gorithm. In the modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm, the first player updates
the action leading to the largest improvement after the second player finds the optimal
counterstrategy. When the second player is trivial, the 2-TBSG becomes an MDP and
the simplex strategy iteration algorithm can find its solution in strongly polynomial
time independent of the discounted factor, which is a property not possessed by the
strategy iteration algorithm in [7].
We also develop a proof technique to prove the strongly polynomial complexity for
a class of geometrically converging algorithms. This class of algorithms includes the
strategy iteration algorithm, the simplex strategy iteration algorithm, and the mod-
ified simplex strategy iteration algorithm. The complexity for the strategy iteration
algorithm given in [7] can be recovered by our techniques. Our techniques use a com-
bination of the current strategy and the equilibrium strategy. We establish a bound
of ratio between the difference of value from the current strategy to the equilibrium
2
strategy, and the difference of value from the combined strategy to the equilibrium
strategy. Using this bound and the geometrically converging property, we can prove
that after a certain number of iterations, one action will disappear forever, which
leads to strongly polynomial convergence when the discount factor is fixed. Although
we have not fully answered the open progblem, our algorithms and analysis point out
a possible way for conquering the difficulities.
Furthermore, 2-TBSG where each state has exactly two actions can be transformed
into a linear complementary problem [9]. An MDP where each state has exactly two
actions can be solved by a combinatorial interior point method [17]. In this paper we
present a way to transform a general 2-TBSG into a 2-TBSG where each state has
exactly two actions. The number of states in this constructed 2-TBSG is O˜(m+ l) (we
use O˜ to hide log factors of l,m). This result enables the application of both results
in [9, 17] to general cases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some basic
concepts and lemmas of the 2-TBSG. In Section 3 we describe the simplex strategy
iteration algorithm and the modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm. The proof
of complexity of the class of geometrically converging algorithm is given in Section
4. The transformation from general 2-TBSGs into special 2-TBSGs is introduced in
Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we present some basic concepts of 2-TBSG. Our focus here is on the
discounted 2-TBSG, defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A discounted 2-TBSG (2-TBSG for short) consists of a tuple
(S,A, P, r, γ), where S = S1 ∪ S2,A = A1 ∪ A2. S1,S2,A1,A2 are the state set and
the action set of each player, respectively. P ∈ R|A|×|S| is the transition probability
matrix, where P (a, s) denotes the probability of the event that the next state is s con-
ditioned on the current action a. r ∈ R|A| is the reward vector, where ra denotes the
immediate reward function received using action a. To be convenient, we use m = |A|
to denote the number of actions, and l = |S| to denote the number of states.
Given a state s ∈ S in 2-TBSG setting, we use As to denote the set of available
actions corresponding to state s. A deterministic strategy (strategy for short) pi =
(pi1, pi2) is defined such that pi1, pi2 are mappings from S1 to A1 and from S2 to A2,
respectively. Moreover, each state s ∈ S matches to an action in As.
For a given strategy pi = (pi1, pi2), we define the transition probability matrix Ppi ∈
R
l×l and reward function rpi ∈ R
l with respect to pi. The i-th row of Ppi is chosen to
be the row of action pi(i) in P , and the i-th element of rpi is chosen to be the reward
of action pi(i). It is easy to observe that the matrix Ppi is a stochastic matrix. We next
define the value vector and the modified reward function.
Definition 2.2. The value vector vpi ∈ Rl of a given strategy pi = (pi1, pi2) is
vpi1,pi2 = vpi = (I − γPpi)
−1rpi.
Definition 2.3. The modified reward function rpi ∈ Rm of a given strategy pi is
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defined as
rpi = r − (J − γP )vpi,
where J ∈ Rm×l is defined as
Jji =
{
1 if j ∈ Ai,
0 otherwise.
Furthermore, for a given 2-TBSG, the optimal counterstrategy against another
player’s given strategy is defined in Definition 2.4. The equilibrium strategy is given
in Definition 2.5.
Definition 2.4. For player 2’s strategy pi2, player 1’s strategy pi1 is the optimal coun-
terstrategy against pi2 if and only if for any strategy pi
′
1 of player 1, we have
vpi1,pi2 ≥ vpi
′
1,pi2 .
Player 2’s optimal counterstrategy can be defined similarly: pi2 is the optimal coun-
terstrategy against pi1 if and only if for any strategy pi
′
2, v
pi1,pi2 ≤ vpi1,pi
′
2. Here for two
value vector v, v′, we say v ≥ v′ (v ≤ v′) if and only if v(s) ≥ v′(s) (v(s) ≤ v′(s)) for
∀s ∈ S.
Definition 2.5. A strategy pi = (pi1, pi2) is called an equilibrium strategy, if and only
if pi1 is the optimal counterstrategy against pi2, and pi2 is the optimal counterstrategy
against pi1.
To describe the property of equilibrium strategies, we present Theorems 2.6 and 2.7
given in [7, 15]. Theorem 2.6 indicates the existence of an equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 2.6. Every 2-TBSG has at least an equilibrium strategy. If pi and pi′ are
two equilibrium strategies, then vpi = vpi
′
. Furthermore, for any player 1’s strategy pi1
(or player 2’s strategy pi2), there always exists a player 2’s optimal counterstrategy pi2
against pi1 (player 1’s optimal counterstrategy pi1 against pi2), and for any two optimal
counterstrategy pi2, pi
′
2 (pi1, pi
′
1), we have v
pi1,pi2 = vpi
′
1,pi2 (vpi1,pi2 = vpi1,pi
′
2).
The next theorem points out a useful depiction of the value function at the equilib-
rium.
Theorem 2.7. Let pi∗ be an equilibrium strategy for 2-TBSG. If pi1 is a strategy
of player 1, and pi2 is player 2’s optimal counterstrategy against pi1, then we have
vpi
∗
≥ vpi1,pi2. The equality holds if and only if (pi1, pi2) is an equilibrium strategy.
We now define the flux vector of a given strategy pi.
Definition 2.8. The flux xpi ∈ Rm of a given strategy pi is defined as
(xpi)pi = (I − γPpi)
−T1,
(xpi)a = 0, ∀a ∈ A, a 6∈ pi.
Our next lemma presents bounds and conditions of the flux vector, and the rela-
tionship among the value function, the flux vector and reduced costs. This lemma and
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the following several lemmas can be found in [7]. To make the paper self-contained,
we briefly give their proofs.
Lemma 2.9. For any strategy pi, we have
(1) 1Txpi = l
1−γ ;
(2) for any a ∈ pi, 1 ≤ xa ≤
l
1−γ ;
(3) 1T vpi = (xpi)T r;
(4) vpi
′
− vpi = (I − γPpi′)
−1(rpi)pi′ , and moreover, 1
T (vpi
′
− vpi) = (xpi
′
)T rpi.
Proof. Item (1) is proved by
1Txpi = 1T (I − γPpi)
−T1 = [(I − γPpi)
−11]T1 =
1
1− γ
1T1 =
l
1− γ
.
Item (2) is due to
(xpi)pi − 1 = γPpi(I − γPpi)
−T1 ≥ 0.
This indicates that (xpi)a ≥ 1, ∀a ∈ pi. Hence we have x
pi ≥ 0 and (xpi)a ≤
l
1−γ from
item (1). Finally the last two items are obtained from
1T vpi = 1T (I − γPpi)
−1rpi = r
T
pi (I − γPpi)
−T1 = rTpi (x
pi)pi = (x
pi)T r,
and
vpi
′
− vpi = (I − γPpi′)
−1rpi′ − (I − γPpi′)
−1(I − γPpi′)v
pi;
= (I − γPpi′)
−1 [r − (J − γP )vpi]pi′ = (I − γPpi′)
−1(rpi)pi′ ;
1T (vpi
′
− vpi) = 1T (I − γPpi′)
−1(rpi)pi′ = (x
pi′)Tpi′(r
pi)pi′ = (x
pi′)T rpi.
In the following, we present a lemma indicating the positiveness or negativeness of
the reduced costs of optimal counterstrategies and equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 2.10. (1) A strategy pi1 for player 1 is an optimal counterstrategy against
player 2’s strategy pi2 if only if (r
pi1,pi2)A1 ≤ 0.
(2) A strategy pi2 for player 2 is an optimal counterstrategy against player 1’s strategy
pi1 if only if (r
pi1,pi2)A2 ≥ 0.
(3) A strategy pi = (pi1, pi2) is an equilibrium strategy if and only if it satisfies:
(rpi1,pi2)A1 ≤ 0, (r
pi1,pi2)A2 ≥ 0.
Proof. If pi1, pi2 satisfies (r
pi1,pi2)A1 ≤ 0, then for any player 1’s strategy pi
′
1, we have
vpi
′
1,pi2 − vpi1,pi2 = (I − γPpi′1,pi2)
−1(rpi1,pi2)pi′1,pi2 =
∞∑
n=0
γnPnpi′1,pi2(r
pi1,pi2)pi′1,pi2 ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from (rpi1,pi2)pi′1 ≤ 0 for pi
′
1 ∈ A1 and (r
pi1,pi2)pi2 = 0.
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Suppose that player 1’s strategy pi1 is the optimal counterstrategy against player
2’s strategy pi2. For any a
′ ∈ As, s ∈ S1 and a
′ 6∈ pi1, we let
pi′1(s1) =
{
a′ if s1 = s;
pi1(s1) else.
Then again from Lemma 2.9 (4), we have
x
pi′1,pi2
a′ r
pi
a′ = 1
T (vpi
′
1,pi2 − vpi1,pi2) ≤ 0,
where the inequality comes from the definition of equilibrium strategies. Since a′ ∈ pi′1,
we have x
pi′1,pi2
a′ ≥ 1, which indicates that r
pi
a′ ≤ 0. With this estimation and r
pi
a = 0 for
∀a ∈ pi, we have proved that (rpi)A1 ≤ 0. Hence, item (1) is established, and the proof
of item (2) is similar. Finally item (3) follows from items (1) and (2) directly.
3. Geometrically Converging Algorithms
Inspired by the simplex method solving the LP corresponding to the MDP and the
strategy iteration algorithm given in [7], we propose a simplex strategy iteration (Al-
gorithm 1) and a modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm (Algorithm 2) for
2-TBSG.
The simplex strategy iteration algorithm can be viewed as a generalization of the
strongly polynomial simplex algorithm in solving MDPs [11]. In our algorithm, both
players update their strategies in turn. In each iteration, while the first player updates
its strategy using the simplex method, which means only updating the action with
the largest reduced cost, the second player updates its strategy according to the op-
timal counterstrategy. When the second player has only one possible action and the
transition matrix is deterministic, the 2-TBSG reduces to a deterministic MDP. Then
the simplex strategy iteration algorithm can find an equilibrium (optimal) strategy in
strongly polynomial time independent of γ, which is a property has not been proven
for the strategy iteration [7].
As for the modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm, it can be viewed as a
modification of the simplex strategy iteration algorithm. In this algorithm, both players
also update their strategies in turn, and the second player always finds the optimal
counterstrategies in its moves. However, in each of the first player’s move, only the
action is updated which leads to the biggest improvement on the value function when
the second player uses the optimal counterstrategy.
It is easy to know that every iteration of the simplex strategy iteration algorithm
involves a step of a simplex update and a solution to an MDP. And every iteration
of the modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm involves solutions to multiple
MDPs. Hence every iteration in both of these two algorithms can be solved in strongly
polynomial time when the discounted factor is fixed.
Next we present a class of geometrically converging algorithms used for proving the
strongly polynomial complexity for several algorithms in the next section.
Definition 3.1. We say a strategy-update algorithm (algorithms which update strate-
gies for both players in each iteration) is a geometrically converging algorithm with
parameter a M , if it updates a strategy pin = (pin1 , pi
n
2 ) to pi
n+1 = (pin+11 , pi
n+1
2 ) such
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Algorithm 1 A Simplex Strategy Iteration Method
1: Initialize: pi01 for player 1, pi
0
2 for player 2, n← 0.
2: repeat
3: Find s ∈ S1 and a ∈ As such that r
pin1 ,pi
n
2
a is the largest among such (s, a).
4: pin+11 (s)← a, pi
n+1
1 (s
′)← pin1 (s
′) for ∀s′ ∈ S1, s
′ 6= s.
5: Find the optimal counterstrategy pin+12 against pi
n+1
1 .
6: until pin1 = pi
n+1
1 .
7: Output: pin1 , pi
n
2 .
Algorithm 2 A Modified Simplex Strategy Iteration Algorithm
1: Initialize: pi1 for player 1, pi2 for player 2
2: Let pi01 ← pi1, n← 0
3: repeat
4: pin+11 ← pi
n
1 , pi
n+1
2 ← pi
n
2
5: for any s ∈ S and action a ∈ As do
6: Let p˜in+11 be the player 1’s strategy where only state s’s action changes to
a, and other states’ actions keep to be the same as pin1 .
7: Let p˜in+12 be the optimal counterstrategy against p˜i
n+1
1 .
8: if 1T vpi
n+1
1 ,pi
n+1
2 ≤ 1T vp˜i
n+1
1 ,p˜i
n+1
2 then
9: pin+11 ← p˜i
n+1
1 , pi
n+1
2 ← p˜i
n+1
2 .
10: end if
11: end for
12: until 1Tpin1 = 1
Tpin+11 .
13: Output: pin1 , pi
n
2 .
that the following properties holds.
• pin+12 is the optimal counterstrategy against pi
n+1
1 ;
• (rpi
n
)pin+11 ≥ 0;
• If 1T (vpi
n+1
− vpi
n
) = 0, then pin is an equilibrium strategy;
• The updates of this algorithm satisfies
1T
(
vpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 − vpi
n+M
1 ,pi
n+M
2
)
≤
(1− γ)2
n2
· 1T
(
vpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 − vpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2
)
.
To begin with, we exhibit a lemma indicating the geometrically converging property
of the value function in the simplex strategy iteration algorithm.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose the sequence of strategy generated by the simplex strategy it-
eration algorithm is pi1 = (pi11, pi
1
2), pi
2 = (pi21, pi
2
2) · · · , pi
n = (pin1 , pi
n
2 ), · · · . Then the
following inequality holds
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n+1
) ≤
(
1−
1− γ
l
)
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
). (1)
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Proof. According to Algorithm 1, we have
1T (vpi
n+1
− vpi
n
) ≥ rpi
n
a1 x
pin+1
a1 ≥ r
pin
a1 ≥
1− γ
l
∑
a∈A1
rpi
n
a x
pin+1
a
≥
1− γ
l
∑
a∈A
rpi
n
a x
pin+1
a =
1− γ
l
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
),
where the second and third inequalities follow from Lemma 2.9 (2) and the choice of
a1 = argmaxa∈A1 r
pin
a , the fourth inequality follows from Lemma 2.10, and the first
inequality and last equation are due to Lemma 2.9 (4) and Lemma 2.10.
Using this lemma, we show in the next proposition that the strategy iteration algo-
rithm, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 all belong to the class of geometrically converging
algorithms.
Proposition 3.3. (1) The strategy iteration algorithm given in [7] is a geometri-
cally converging algorithm with parameter M = O
(
1
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
;
(2) The simplex strategy iteration algorithm (Algorithm 1) is a geometrically con-
verging algorithm with parameter M = O
(
l
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
;
(3) The modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm (Algorithm 2) is a geometrically
converging algorithm with parameter M = O
(
l
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
;
Proof. It is easy to verify that the previous described three algorithms satisfy the
first three conditions in the definition of geometrically converging algorithms. Next, we
prove that all of these algorithms satisfy the last condition. For the strategy iteration
algorithm, according to Lemma 4.8 and Lemma 5.4 given in [7], we have
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n+1
) ≤ γ1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
).
Hence if M = 2c1
1−γ log
l
1−γ = O
(
1
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
(c1 ≥ 1 is a constant), then we obtain
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n+M
) ≤ γM1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
) ≤ γ−2 logγ
n
1−γ 1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
)
=
(1− γ)2
l2
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
),
and the last condition of geometrically converging algorithms is verified.
For the simplex strategy iteration algorithm, if we choose M = O
(
l
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
(c2 ≥ 1 is a constant), then according to inequality (1) we have
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n+M
) ≤
(1− γ)2
l2
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
),
and the last condition of geometrically converging algorithms is verified.
Finally we consider the modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm. For n ≥ 2,
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let a1 = argmaxa∈A1 r
pin
a , where a1 is an action of state s1. Let
pi′1(s) =
{
a1, if s = s1,
pin(s), others,
pi′2 be player 2’s optimal counterstrategy against pi
′
1, and pi
′ = (pi′1, pi
′
2). Then from
inequality (1), we have
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
′
) ≤
(
1−
1− γ
n
)
1T (v∗ − vpi
n
).
According to Algorithm 2, we have
1T vpi
n+1
≥ 1T vpi
′
,
which leads to the following estimation:
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n+1
) ≤
(
1−
1− γ
n
)
1T (v∗ − vpi
n
).
Therefore, similar to the previous case we can choose M = O
(
l
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
such that
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n+M
) ≤
(1− γ)2
l2
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
),
and the last condition of geometrically converging algorithms is verified.
4. Strongly Polynomial Complexity of Geometrically Converging
Algorithms
In this section, we develop the strongly polynomial property of geometric converging
algorithms if the parameter M is viewed as a constant. Slightly different from the
proof in [7] for the strategy (pin1 , pi
n
2 ) at the n-th iteration, we present a proof by
considering the strategy (pin1 , pi
∗
2), where (pi
∗
1 , pi
∗
2) is an equilibrium strategy. We show
that 1T (vpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 − vpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 ) can be both upper and lower bounded by some proportion of
1T (vpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 − vpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2 ). By applying the property of geometrically converging algorithms,
we obtain that after a certain number of iterations, a player 1’s action will disappear
in pin1 forever.
Theorem 4.1. Any geometrically converging algorithm with a parameter M finds the
equilibrium strategy in
O(Mm)
number of iterations.
Proof. Suppose pi1 = (pi11 , pi
1
2), pi
2 = (pi21 , pi
2
2), · · · , pi
n = (pin1 , pi
n
2 ) is the sequence
generated by a geometrically converging algorithm. We define ηn = (pin1 , pi
∗
2), where
pi∗ = (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2) is one of the equilibrium strategy.
9
According to Lemma 2.10 and the fact that pin+12 is the optimal counterstrategy
against pin+11 , and the definition of geometrically converging algorithm, we have
1T (vpi
n+1
− vpi
n
) =
∑
a∈pin+11
xpi
n+1
a r
pin
a +
∑
a∈pin+12
xpi
n+1
a r
pin
a ≥
∑
a∈pin+11
xpi
n+1
a r
pin
a ≥ 0,
which directly leads to
1T vpi
n
≤ 1T vpi
n+1
. (2)
According to Lemma 2.10, we have
1T (vpi
∗
− vη
n
) = 1T (vpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 − vpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 ) = −(xpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 )T rpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 = −(xpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 )TA1r
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
A1
≥ 0,
1T (vη
n
− vpi
n
) = 1T (vpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 − vpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2 ) = (xpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 )T rpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2 = (xpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 )TA1r
pin1 ,pi
n
2
A1
≥ 0,
which implies
1T vpi
n
≤ 1T vη
n
≤ 1T vpi
∗
. (3)
We next prove the following inequality:
1T (vpi
∗
− vη
n
) ≥
1− γ
n
· 1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
). (4)
A direct calculation gives
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
) = 1T (vpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 − vpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2 ) = −(xpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2 )T rpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2
= −
∑
a∈pin1
xpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2
a r
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
a −
∑
a∈pin2
xpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2
a r
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
a ≤ −
∑
a∈pin1
xpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2
a r
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
a ,
where the last inequality is obtained from Lemma 2.10. Then noticing that
1 ≤ xpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2
a , x
pin1 ,pi
∗
2
a ≤
1− γ
l
, rpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2
a ≤ 0, ∀a ∈ pi
n
1 ,
we have
1T (vpi
∗
− vη
n
) = 1T (vpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 − vpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 ) = −(xpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2 )T rpi
∗
1 ,pi
∗
2 = −
∑
a∈pin1
xpi
n
1 ,pi
∗
2
a r
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
a
≥ −
1− γ
l
∑
a∈pin1
xpi
n
1 ,pi
n
2
a r
pi∗1 ,pi
∗
2
a ≥
1− γ
l
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
).
Then the inequality (4) is proved.
Finally, we prove that for any n, either there exists an action a1 in pi
n
1 will never
belong to pin+m1 when m > M , or we have
1T (vpi
n+M+1
− vpi
n+M
) = 0.
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Actually for any p > M , suppose 1T (vpi
n+M+1
− vpi
n+M
) 6= 0, we obtain
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n+p
) < 1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n+M
) ≤
(1− γ)2
l2
1T (vpi
∗
− vpi
n
)
from (2) and the definition of geometrically converging algorithm. Hence according to
(3) and (4), we get
1T (vpi
∗
−vη
n+p
) ≤ 1T (vpi
∗
−vpi
n+p
) <
(1− γ)2
l2
1T (vpi
∗
−vpi
n
) ≤
1− γ
l
1T (vpi
∗
−vη
n
). (5)
Therefore, choosing a1 = argmina∈pin1 r
pi∗
a ≤ 0, and because for any a ∈ pi
n
1 , r
pi∗
a ≤ 0
according to Lemma 2.10, we obtain
1T (vpi
∗
− vη
n
) = −
∑
a∈pin1
xη
n
a r
pi∗
a ≤

∑
a∈pin1
xη
n
a

 · (−rpi∗a1 ) ≤ − l1− γ · rpi∗a1
from Lemma 2.9. If a ∈ pin+p1 , we have
1T (vpi
∗
− vη
n+p
) = −
∑
a∈pin+p1
xη
n+p
a r
pi∗
a ≥ −x
ηn+p
a1 r
pi∗
a1 ≥ −r
pi∗
a1 ,
where the first inequality is due to Lemma 2.10 and the second inequality is due to
Lemma 2.9. Therefore, combining these two inequalities and the inequality (5) and
noticing that rpi
∗
a1 ≤ 0, we get
−rpi
∗
a1 ≤ 1
T (vpi
∗
− vη
n+p
) <
1− γ
l
1T (vpi
∗
− vη
n
) ≤ −
1− γ
l
·
l
1− γ
· rpi
∗
a1 = −r
pi∗
a1 .
This leads to contradiction.
The previous derivation means that if 1T (vpi
n+M+1
−vpi
n+M
) = 0 does not hold for n,
then an action of pin must disappear after pin+M forever. Hence every afterM iterations
an action will disappear forever. This process cannot happen for more than m− l times
(since there are m actions and every strategy has n actions), which indicates that for
some n > M(m− l),
1T (vpi
n+M+1
− vpi
n+M
) = 0.
It follows from the definition of geometrically converging algorithm that pin+M is the
equilibrium strategy. This indicates that within
O(mM)
number of iterations, we can find one of the equilibrium strategies.
Our next theorem presents the complexity of the strategy iteration algorithm, the
simplex strategy iteration algorithm and the modified simplex strategy iteration algo-
rithm.
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Theorem 4.2. The following algorithms has strongly polynomial convergence when
the discounted factor is fixed.
• The strategy iteration algorithm given in [7] can find the equilibrium strategy
within O
(
m
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
iterations;
• The simplex strategy iteration algorithm (Algorithm 1) can find the equilibrium
strategy within O
(
ml
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
iterations;
• The modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm (Algorithm 2) can find the
equilibrium strategy within O
(
ml
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
iterations;
Proof. The proof of this theorem directly follows from Theorem 4.1 and Proposition
3.3.
Remark 1. It is easy to note that the terminated condition of the simplex strategy
iteration algorithm and the modified simplex strategy iteration algorithm is equivalent
to the condition of meeting an equilibrium strategy. Hence the above theorem also
indicates that these two algorithms terminate within O
(
ml
1−γ log
l
1−γ
)
iterations.
5. Transform General 2-TBSGs into Special 2-TBSGs
We prove in this section that every 2-TBSG can be transformed into a new 2-TBSG
where each state has exactly two actions. A formal description is given in the next
theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Given a 2-TBSG with l states and m actions whose state set is S, we
can construct a new 2-TBSG with state set S ′ satisfying the following properties.
• The number of states in the constructed 2-TBSG is bounded by a polynomial of
m and l:
|S ′| ≤ m+ l logm = O˜(m+ l). (6)
• S ⊂ S ′ and the value function V at the equilibrium of the constructed 2-TBSG
satisfies:
V (s) = c · v(s), ∀s ∈ S, (7)
where v is the equilibrium value function of the original 2-TBSG, and
c = γ
⌈logm⌉−1
⌈logm⌉ . (8)
Proof. Our proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we construct a new 2-TBSG
where each state has no more than two actions, and the value function at equilibrium of
original 2-TBSG can be easily obtained given the equilibrium value of the constructed
2-TBSG (proportional to the value at some states in the constructed 2-TBSG). In the
second part, we modify the constructed 2-TBSG so that each state has exactly two
actions, while keeping the equilibrium value unchanged by constructing an obvious
undesirable action for those states with only one action.
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Figure 1. Example when t = 4
s
s1
s2 s3
s4 s5 s6 s7
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0
0 0
0 0 0 0
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
We first construct a binary tree rooted at s with exactly |As| leaves, and the depth
of the tree is exactly p = ⌈logm⌉. This tree is called the depth-p binary tree of state
s:
• In the first p− log⌈|As|⌉ layers, each node has only one child.
• In the last log⌈|As|⌉ layers, it is a binary tree with exactly |As| leaves.
• Every leaves has depth p.
Each node except the root s and all leaves in the depth-p binary tree of s are
assigned with a new state whose owner is same as state s (player 1 or player 2). We
use S1 to denote the set of states in the first p − 2 layers, and S2 to denote the set
of states in the (p − 1)-th layer. The parameters (transition probabilities, rewards,
discounted factor) are given as follows:
• For each state in S1, one or two actions are assigned to it depending on how
many children states (its children in the binary tree) it has, with probability 1
leading to a child state and reward 0.
• For set S2, each of their children nodes is assigned with an action of s in the
original 2-TBSG. This can be done since the total number of children nodes of
S2 is exactly |As|. For each state in S2, its actions are given by its children nodes.
The transition probability and reward of taking that action is assigned to be the
same as in the original 2-TBSG.
• The discounted factor in the constructed 2-TBSG is given by δ = γ1/p.
A special case of can be viewed in Figure 1 when p = 4, |As| = 7.
It is easy to obtain that the number of states in the constructed 2-TBSG is no more
than
m+ n logm.
We next present a definition of final actions and the executing path of a state.
Definition 5.2. For a given strategy pi′ in the constructed 2-TBSG cases and s ∈ S,
we continue the following process:
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• s0 ← s, i← 0;
• If pi′(sn) is a constructed action (not an action in the original 2-TBSG), then we
let sn+1 to be the state obtained by executing action pi
′(sn). Since all constructed
actions are deterministic, there is only one choice of sn+1. Then let n← n+ 1.
• If pi′(sn) is an action in the original 2-TBSG, then we stop this process, and call
pi′(sn) ∈ A to be the final action of s, and path s0 → s1 → · · · → sn → pi
′(sn) to
be the executed path from s to action pi′(sn).
Notice that the previous described process must be ended in p − 1 steps, and all
states in the executed path of s must lie in the depth-p binary tree of s. For any state
s ∈ S and a ∈ As, there exists a unique executed path from s to a. In Figure 1 we
present an example of final actions and executed paths. When the strategy pi′ follows
bold arrows, the final action of s will be a3, and the executed path from s to a3 is
s→ s1 → s2 → s5 → a3.
Based on the final actions, we define the corresponding strategy pi with respect to
pi′ in the original 2-TBSG: for each state s ∈ S, pi(s) is defined to be the final action
of s in pi′. Next, we prove that for any state s ∈ S, the value of s in strategy pi′ agrees
with δp−1 times the value of s in strategy pi. Actually, along the trajectory of pi′, we
meet a final action every p steps, and only final actions have nonzero rewards. Hence
values of s in pi and pi′ satisfy
V pi
′
(s) = Epi′
∞∑
i=1
ra · δ
pi−1 = δp−1Epi
∞∑
i=1
ra · γ
i−1 = δp−1vpi(s),
where a′ denotes actions along strategy pi′, and a denotes actions along strategy pi.
What is left in the proof is to show that if pi′ = (pi′1, pi
′
2) is an equilibrium strategy in
the constructed 2-TBSG, then pi = (pi1, pi2) is an equilibrium strategy in the original
2-TBSG. For any player 1’s state s and action a ∈ As, we use η = (η1, pi2) to denote
the strategy in the original 2-TBSG:
η1(s1) =
{
a if s1 = s,
pi1(s1) otherwise.
In the constructed 2-TBSG, there exists a unique executed path T from s to action a,
and for any state s1 on this path T , there is only one action τ(s1) in A
′
s1 such that the
next state when using τ(s1) also lies on T . We define player 1’s strategy η
′ = (η′1, pi2)
as follows:
η′1(s1) =


τ(s1) if s1 ∈ T,
λ(s1) if s1 is in the depth-p binary tree of s and s1 6∈ T,
pi′1(s1) if s1 is not in the depth-p binary tree of s,
where λ(s1) can be chosen A
′
s1 arbitrarily. Then it is easy to examine that η is the
corresponding strategy of η′. Since η is an equilibrium strategy of the constructed
2-TBSG, we have
vη = δ−p+1V η
′
≤ δ−p+1V pi
′
= vpi,
where the inequality is due to the property of equilibrium strategy. Furthermore,
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according to Lemma 2.9 and Lemma 2.10, we have xηarpia = 1
T (vη − vpi) ≥ 0, where
x
η
a ≥ 1. This indicates that rpia ≤ 0. Since a can be chosen arbitrarily, we have (r
pi)A1 ≤
0, and similarly (rpi)A2 ≥ 0. Again according to Lemma 2.10, we obtain that pi is an
equilibrium strategy of the original 2-TBSG.
Next, we handle states with only one actions. For each of such state, our technique is
to construct another action which is obviously unacceptable to appear in equilibrium
strategies. For state s with only one action a1, we assign it with another action a2:
• The transition probability using action a2 is identical to a1.
• If state s belongs to player 1, then the reward of a2 is assigned to be smaller
than the reward of a1.
• If state s belongs to player 2, then the reward of a2 is assigned to be larger than
the reward of a1.
If we construct actions in such ways, it is obvious that action a2 is inferior to a1
according to its owner (player 1 or player 2). Hence any strategy which possesses a2 is
not an equilibrium strategy, since switching action a2 into a1 leads to a better strategy
for its owner. Combining these two parts together proves Theorem 5.1.
Remark 2. Since it is easy to obtain the equilibrium strategy from the equilibrium
value and vice versa, we can solve the original 2-TBSG by solving the constructed
2-TBSG.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose two different algorithms for 2-TBSG with strongly polyno-
mial complexity: the simplex strategy iteration algorithm and the modified simplex
strategy iteration algorithm. We propose a class of geometrically converging algorithms
and develop a proof technique to prove the strongly polynomial complexity when the
discounted factor is fixed. Furthermore, we present how to transform a general 2-TBSG
into a special 2-TBSG where each state has exactly two actions. Specifically, our sim-
plex strategy iteration algorithm is coincident with the simplex method in the MDP
cases.These analysis and properties shed some light on the open problem of solving
the deterministic 2-TBSG in strongly polynomial time independent of the discount
factor.
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